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One of the most fundamental and yet tenuous assumptions supporting the foundations of economics is that man is
rational – a homo economicus. Yet, a new wave in economics now questions that very assumption, and the findings
are at the intersection of the social sciences of economics and psychology.
Speaking at a Singapore Management University (SMU) Social Sciences Capstone Seminar
(http://www.socsc.smu.edu.sg/events/seminar_series/social_sciences_capstone_2012.asp), Nattavudh “Nick”
Powdthavee, an assistant professor from Nanyang Technological University explained why economists can benefit if
they would listen to what psychologists had to say about human behaviour.
John Stuart Mill, a British philosopher and economist, was influential in establishing the notion that people are
rational and self-interested actors. Based on this, Milton Friedman developed a Nobel prize-winning theory which
posits that consumption choices are not determined by people's current incomes but longer-term income
expectations.
“That the hypothesis does not fit with the empirics gave Milton Friedman a bit of a headache,” Powdthavee quipped.
The implications of Friedman’s hypothesis were that high-income earners would save the same proportion of their
income as the lower-income earners but multiple studies have demonstrated that this is not true. A case in point is
that there appeared to be no consumption-smoothing among both the rich and the poor in America during a
recession.
Rational no more
James Duesenberry’s work in the 1950s on saving patterns in America provoked some rethinking on the matter. It
seemed that consumption depended not on permanent income as postulated by Friedman but on how others
consumed and also one’s own past experiences. Once a certain relative standard of living is achieved, it appeared to
be difficult to cut back on one’s consumption even in the face of a recession. Another seemingly irrational outcome
was that happiness depended not only on one’s own income, but also the income of others.
Powdthavee remarked, “Economics is changing. We are now moving towards incorporating new ways of thinking from
different neighbouring fields such as psychology and sociology.” Two prominent characters that have helped
changed economics were psychologists Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman.
Economists had previously assumed that risk preferences were stable across decision contexts. This meant that a
risk-averse person would remain risk averse in any given situation. However, these two men debunked this idea by
demonstrating that people were not risk averse but loss-averse.
Simple surveys conducted by both men – now replicated all over behavioural economics lectures around the world –
have demonstrated this somewhat irrational phenomenon.
Faced with a decision between winning $10,000 versus a 50 per cent chance of winning $20,000 or nothing, the
majority would opt for the sure win, demonstrating risk minimising behaviour. However, when presented with a
somewhat equivalent but different decision – a choice between losing $10,000 versus a 50 per cent chance of losing
$20,000 or nothing, many would now exhibit risk-seeking behaviour and opt for the latter, to take a chance, or to
take on risk.
While seemingly simple, the explanation is rather subtle – “We hate losing more than we love winning,” said
Powdthavee. We also tend to stick to our original decisions, in what has become known as the status quo bias.
A UFO cult leader, Marian Keech had predicted the end of the world on a specific date in 1954. Her followers
believed that UFOs would save them when it happened.
As we now believe, the world did not end as prophesised. While regular economists might expect from this that
Keech's followers would denounce the leader and disavow their beliefs, psychologist Leon Festinger predicted
otherwise. He suspected that when the world did not end, it would create a cognitive dissonance in the minds of
these followers and the leader. They would then attempt to rationalise their original decision.
Festinger was right. Almost everyone in the cult concluded that it was due to their prayers that God had spared the
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planet from destruction. “In other words, when dissonance occurs, instead of altering behaviours, people tend to
create additional reasons to support their original decisions to make them feel better about themselves,” said
Powdthavee.
This might also explain why the gory pictures on cigarette packages do not discourage smokers: The discomfort from
admitting that their original decision to take up smoking was wrong might be more uncomfortable than the notion of
future illnesses.
A curious demonstration of the status quo bias can also be seen in organ donation across Europe. Denmark,
Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Germany have far lower rates compared to other countries in Europe. Countries
like Portugal and Austria, for example, had a consent rate of close to 99 per cent consent while Denmark clocked in
at 4.25 per cent.
This curious disparity might be explained by differences found in the consent forms. Those with the poor rates of
donation asked: “If you want to donate your organs, please tick the box”. Those with high donation rates asked
their people to opt out of the donation scheme.
This same effect has been observed in the United States' pension programme (commonly known as the 401K), where
an opt-out increased participation tremendously, compared to the opt-in. Clearly, many more people are happy to go
with the default or status quo, rather than act against something. Yet, a true homo economicus would be
indifferent to how the question is being asked.
Incorporating new perspectives
Another bastion of microeconomics, the indifference curve theory, is also being challenged. The theory is predicated
on a clear substitution effect between two things, where a person for instance would be willing to substitute a
certain number of apples for a defined number of laptops. It follows that a person’s willingness to pay for something
is equal to their willingness to accept compensation to be deprived of that item.
However, if you had bought some World Cup finals tickets for $1,000, it is unlikely that you would also be willing to
part with it for $1,000. The “endowment effect”, or the tendency to value almost anything more once your property
right is established, is inconsistent with consumer and indifference curve.
The emergence of behavioural economics has led to many meetings between psychologists and economists. One
result of these discussions was the realisation that context mattered in the decision making process and the
evaluation of outcomes.
Participants in an experiment with crisps by D. Gilbert rated the level of enjoyment of a bag of crisps which they
have not eaten higher, when it was placed next to a slice of chocolate cake then when it was placed next to a can
of sardines. Once they had eaten the crisps, they both on average rated the level of enjoyment the same. “Context
has the ability to distort our ability to predict the way we would feel in future,” concluded Powdthavee. But the
question is why do we behave in this way?
Kahneman and Frederick (2002) explained it as having a rational and emotional side in our brain. When making
decisions under pressure or with incomplete information, our emotional brain tends to come out on top. Evolution had
programmed emotion to override rationality in high pressure situations, from the time cavemen encountered tigers in
jungles where emotion would trigger an immediate impulse to run while the rational mind might wish to delay to
consider the situation.
Understanding the way the rational and emotional sides of the brain works is important to economics. Behavioural
economics today acknowledge that the fundamental assumption of the homo economicus or the rational man is
flawed. Economists now recognise the need to understand better how minds work in different situations, and so
there is an increased need for economists to interact with other disciplines such as psychology and neurology. Policy
design should also incorporate findings in behavioural economics to address real world challenges effectively, and
perhaps – rationally.
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